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TRAIN, CERTIFY, ALERT, DEPLOY -IMPLICATIONS OF A NEW MOBILIZATION MODEL FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
We must change the Army's go-to-war protocols. It is no longer practical to follow cold war regimens of train, alert, mobilize, train, certify, deploy. We must move to train, certify, alert, deploy.  LTG Steven Blum Today's model for mobilizing the Army National Guard (ARNG) was developed to support the nation's defense strategy during the Cold War. This strategy included mobilization of ARNG units as an integral part of the total force and included adequate time in the process for units to achieve readiness levels required to accomplish assigned missions. The Cold War ended nearly 15 years ago. In the decade following the end of the Cold War the national defense strategy called for armed forces that were appropriately sized and shaped to simultaneously fight and win two major theater wars. 1 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review lays out the current defense strategy that requires forces to be sized and shaped to: § Defend the United States; § Deter aggression and coercion in critical regions around the world; § Swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping major conflicts while preserving the President's option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflict; § Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingencies. 2 The nation will continue to adjust its defense strategy to account for ever-changing global threats to national interests. Regardless of the strategy developed to protect United States interests at home and abroad, the ARNG has always been and will continue to be essential to ensuring the strategy is successful. 3 The new defense strategy calls for a review of how the ARNG is organized and its capabilities employed to support the strategy. 4 Part of this review must focus on how the nation resources, trains and mobilizes the ARNG. In a report looking at how to improve the efficiency of mobilization for the reserve forces, the General Accounting Office (GAO) noted the mobilization process had to be modified after September 11, 2001 because it was not responsive to the requirements to react to terrorist attacks or unplanned contingency operations. 5 Today we find ARNG soldiers serving in ongoing contingency operations in many places including Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. 6 They are also serving in ongoing contingencies here in the United States. Many of the operations have no definitive end date and will require continued contributions from the ARNG.
While the defense strategy has changed over the years to account for an ever-changing security environment, the processes used to train and mobilize the ARNG have changed little.
This paper explores the new mobilization model and its implications for the ARNG. It lays out initiatives that should be implemented and suggests a few key readiness areas that must be improved to assist the ARNG in achieving and sustaining the readiness levels required to meet the timelines of the new model.
The mobilization timeline begins when a Combatant Commander identifies a requirement for forces to support operations in his Area of Responsibility and ends when individuals or units are deployed. A series of complex steps in between include validating and sourcing the requirement, alert notification, and mobilization. 7 In examining the current and new mobilization models, this paper addresses these steps. It focuses more specifically, however, on the tasks units and individuals must accomplish, prior to the mobilization timeline starting, to be ready to fulfill a Combatant Commander's force requirements when needed. It is successful accomplishment of these tasks that ultimately ensures readiness of ARNG units and their subsequent ability to meet shortened mobilization timelines.
CURRENT MOBILIZATION MODEL -TRAIN, ALERT, MOBILIZE, TRAIN, CERTIFY, DEPLOY
The current mobilization model of "train, alert, mobilize, train, certify, deploy" is lengthy, cumbersome and inefficient. Its processes are not optimized to provide trained and ready ARNG units to Combatant Commanders when needed in today's operational environment.
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The mobilization process begins to bog down when tasks are duplicated at various levels within the process, both at home station and at the mobilization station. For ARNG units, implementation of this model is largely governed by two U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM)
Regulations. The first, FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, Volume III, Reserve Component Unit
Commander's Handbook (RCUCH), specifies numerous tasks and actions with associated standards and requirements that units must accomplish in order to successfully mobilize and deploy. The second, FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, prescribes pre-mobilization training requirements and expected training proficiency levels, and prioritizes required training support.
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A brief discussion of each of the elements of the current mobilization model and how they fit in the process outlined in these regulations follows.
Units generally focus training on one primary federal (wartime) mission while maintaining the ability to respond to requirements of the state Governors. Units train on a set of mission essential tasks -designated as pre-mobilization tasks and approved by a higher headquartersduring their allocated 39 training days each year. These tasks come from the unit's mission essential task list (METL). The METL is derived primarily from the requirements of the unit's wartime mission and is a list of tasks units must be able to perform in order to successfully accomplish that mission. Every one to three years, units receive an external assessment of their ability to properly perform pre-mobilization tasks. This mission required the company to train and certify on a set of tasks that were not on their METL. This additional training extended the time the company spent at the mobilization station. 15 Prior to deployment, units are trained and certified, possibly for the second or third time, on those tasks deemed essential to successful accomplishment of the mission for which the unit was mobilized.
Throughout the processes of the current mobilization model numerous actions and tasks are duplicated. This duplication produces inefficiency and only serves to lengthen an already long mobilization timeline. The contemporary operating environment requires a new model that ensures timely mobilization of ARNG units.
NEW MOBILIZATION MODEL -TRAIN, CERTIFY, ALERT, DEPLOY
The new mobilization model of "train, certify, alert, deploy" is not specifically defined.
However it suggests, if only through a reduction in the number of steps, a shorter mobilization timeline. For the ARNG, the main implication of a shorter timeline associated with this new mobilization model is that units must maintain a higher level of readiness. Readiness is indeed a priority for the National Guard as communicated by LTG Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to state Adjutants General. He stated, "readiness has got to be the thing you focus on, 24/7/365." 16 One of the goals of a shorter timeline, made possible by implementing the new mobilization model, is to move from "just in case" to "just-in-time" mobilizations. 17 The "just in case" approach to mobilization involves mobilizing too many units for the exact reason the phrase implies -just in case they are needed. In today's operational environment, a mission and its corresponding force requirement may change after units identified to fulfill the requirement have already been alerted and mobilized. The "just in case" approach to mobilization can lead to force requirements being overestimated to ensure the right capabilities are available if the operational mission does change after the mobilization timeline has started.
18
While this approach alleviates the need to restart an already long mobilization timeline, it does not contribute to shortening that timeline. The new mobilization model is envisioned to shorten the timeline and to facilitate a "just in time" approach to mobilization. This approach is quicker and more flexible and involves mobilizing the right forces for the right mission only when needed. 19 The primary difference between the new mobilization model and the current one is the concept of units or individuals being trained and certified prior to alert and subsequent mobilization. When addressing attendees at the 2003 National Guard Association conference, the Chief of Staff of the Army noted that ARNG units should be trained before being mobilized and brought on active duty, as opposed to training them after mobilization. Additionally, he acknowledged that the ARNG needed more resources in order to increase training readiness.
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More resources, which include funding, equipment, facilities, personnel and additional training days will assist ARNG units in completing required training and certification prior to alert and mobilization. Moving to a "train, certify, alert, deploy" mobilization model with a "just in time" approach to mobilization will facilitate providing the Combatant Commanders the forces and capabilities they need at the right time. Sustaining a high level of readiness of ARNG units is clearly the key to meeting the timelines of this new mobilization model and fulfilling the "just in time" approach to mobilization.
ACHIEVING READINESS LEVELS TO MEET TIMELINES OF THE NEW MODEL
Many improvements and efficiencies can be made at individual and unit level in order to achieve a level of readiness required to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
However, the preponderance of effort and change must be made at organizational levels up to and including the Defense Department and Congress. LTG Blum acknowledged that, "Readiness is a product of resources and training. We must focus our training on the myriad of missions we will be asked to perform and we -the National Guard Bureau -must obtain the resources necessary for the soldiers and airmen to accomplish the mission." 22 With adequate resources applied to the right efforts, improved readiness in ARNG units can become a reality.
The following sections outline a number of ongoing or recommended initiatives designed to improve ARNG readiness levels. These initiatives include transforming the ARNG, rebalancing and restructuring the force, establishing standard operating cycles and improving soldier, family and employer readiness. Implementation of these initiatives supported with adequate resources will contribute to achieving the readiness levels in ARNG units required to make the new mobilization model feasible.
ARNG TRANSFORMATION "Although the basic mission of the National Guard has not changed, future defense strategy will necessitate internal changes to meet new roles." 23 The ARNG must change to ensure it remains relevant and ready to accomplish its basic mission in support of the national defense strategy. Relevant for the ARNG means possessing the capabilities Combatant Commanders require to successfully accomplish assigned missions. In order to be relevant, the ARNG must be ready. 24 Ready, in the context of this paper, refers to regulatory standards of readiness that must be maintained in order for individual soldiers and units to be deemed available for deployment in support of Combatant Commanders' requirements. ARNG transformation is one effort that will assist ARNG units in achieving the personnel and training readiness levels required to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
Readiness is one of the primary focuses of ARNG transformation. 25 A major impediment to maintaining a level of unit readiness required to meet quicker mobilization timelines is the significant difference in the authorized end strength and force structure authorizations in the ARNG. The current authorized end strength of the ARNG is 350,000 with a force structure authorization of 388,000 spaces. 26 The difference clearly indicates the ARNG cannot have a sufficient number of soldiers to fill all authorized units to meet required personnel readiness levels. Absent an increase in authorized end strength, the ARNG will have to reduce force structure to fill units with enough soldiers to increase personnel readiness. This means eliminating units that make up the overall force structure. pool of soldiers and units. 33 The ARNG has already initiated rebalancing by converting less demanded field artillery units to more highly demanded military police units. 34 Rebalancing efforts will not only improve the defense department's ability to fulfill its mission and reduce involuntary mobilizations but will, in conjunction with restructuring, improve the ability of the Army National Guard to sustain readiness levels required to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
The ARNG contains a significant portion of the Army's heavy combat forces. A number of defense studies have suggested that there may no longer be a need to maintain a large number of these heavy units. 35 The necessity for more agile, flexible forces to support the new defense strategy will require the Army to convert some of these units as part of force rebalancing and restructuring. 36 The Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (AGRI) is an ongoing initiative designed to do just that. The concept of the AGRI includes establishing multi-functional divisions (MFD) and mobile light brigades (MLB) by converting existing heavy and light combat force structure. 37 The ARNG should establish MLBs first because they will not only provide a capability to respond more rapidly to a major war and other military operations across the spectrum, but will also be able to respond to state emergency missions more quickly than heavier combat units. 38 "In general, lighter forces would be more strategically deployable, easier to train and less costly to sustain." 39 These type units will require less training, both preand post-mobilization due to reduced complexity in mission essential tasks and will be better able to maintain the readiness levels required to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
Senior officials within the Department of Defense are committed to rebalancing the force that in the long term will enable the ARNG to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
In a memorandum to Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Under

Secretaries of Defense, addressing rebalancing AC/RC forces, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld directed Services to "submit Program Change Proposals to correct imbalances that result in lengthy, repeated, or frequent mobilization of RC individuals and units by changing force structure and/or mix, using contractors or civilians, or mitigating shortfalls through technology. Specifically address capabilities that reside exclusively or predominately in the RC and are in high demand because of ongoing operations and the Global War on Terror, capabilities that are required for homeland defense missions, and capabilities critical to post hostilities operations." 40 The Chief of the National Guard Bureau stated that critical components of National Guard transformation include, "…streamlining forces and organizations, creating or changing forces to meet near and long-term needs, making organizations leaner, smaller and more effective; and, training and equipping to full readiness levels…" 41 The Chief of Staff of the Army has stressed that both active and reserve components must be modular and tailorable, and that they must be structured to enable combining elements of both components into different force packages with specific capabilities. This will get the right force and capabilities into the fight quicker by reducing the time required to train and mobilize. 42 The Army's vision for balancing and structuring the force is depicted in Figure 1 . This vision includes portions of the RC, including the ARNG, which must maintain the highest readiness levels. This force structure consists of combat, combat support and combat service support units with a capability to respond very quickly in support of homeland security and homeland defense either in State or Federal status. Additionally, the RC will be structured to provide a campaign quality force that builds depth for forward presence rotations. Further depth is build into the structure with primarily combat support and combat service support capabilities to allow the Army to sustain major wars.
FIGURE 1. STRUCTURING THE FORCE 44
The Army and the ARNG must continue to aggressively implement ongoing force rebalancing and restructuring initiatives. Specifically, they must focus on rebalancing to ensure depth across the force in high demand capabilities. They must also restructure the force to consist of lighter, more modular and tailorable ARNG units with less intensive training requirements that will ultimately enable those units to sustain the readiness levels required to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
STANDARD OPERATING CYCLES
As previously highlighted in this paper, significant numbers of ARNG units and soldiers are currently deployed around the world in support of ongoing operations, many of which have no definitive end date. To sustain these operations, use of ARNG units will continue. The continued use of the ARNG, both in support of ongoing operations and in contingency operations, highlights a need to provide a level of predictability to assist units and individual soldiers in achieving readiness levels required to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
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The Army should establish standard operating cycles for ARNG units to provide this predictability. In its simplest form, this operating cycle would begin with periods of maintenance and training followed by a standard length deployment and ending with periods of maintenance and training. 46 The operating cycle would be similar to a concept the Air Force established in 1998. Their Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept "established a standard 15-month operating cycle and divided the Air Force into 10 groups, each containing a mix of active, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve. Two groups were scheduled to deploy during each of the five, 3-month increments within the standard 15-month operating cycle." 47 The Army would have to lengthen these timelines to ensure that maximum effectiveness of the capabilities required for an operation was achieved during the maintenance, training and deployment periods.
In addition to providing predictability, standard operating cycles can provide a method for determining priority of and resource levels for ARNG units. The Army provides resources to units based on priorities. High priority units, those identified to mobilize and deploy first, are resourced at higher levels while units scheduled to deploy later are resourced at lower levels.
Resource levels directly affect readiness of ARNG units. The level at which a unit is resourced "affects its priority with respect to (1) recruiting and filling vacancies, (2) full-time staffing, (3) filling equipment needs, (4) maintaining equipment, (5) obtaining access to schools and training seats, and (6) funding for extra drills." 48 The impact on personnel and training readiness can be significant without adequate resources. The Department of Defense clearly cannot resource all ARNG units at levels required to consistently meet deployment readiness standards, but could fund units based on standard operating cycles. Resource levels could be adjusted as units prepare for a rotation based on a standard operating cycle. Using this concept, units would increase readiness as a predictable mobilization approaches. 49 The months from the mobilization date. The battery was identified and appropriately resourced and trained to accomplish the mission under a derivative unit identification code (DUIC). About 3 months prior to mobilization the unit was officially alerted and had already completed most of the training and certifications required to deploy. Due to the advance notification as part of the standard rotation schedule, soldiers were prepared and readiness of the unit was high. 50 This one vignette provides an excellent example of how a standard operating cycle can both provide predictability and improve readiness.
Standard operating cycles provide predictability that will assist ARNG units in increasing readiness as they prepare for mobilization. Predictability allows units to anticipate periods of time in which the possibility of mobilization is lowest and therefore facilitates scheduling extended military training for soldiers. It also gives units windows of time when the likelihood of mobilization is the highest. This allows units to place additional emphasis on increasing readiness with a particular focus on screening medical, dental and personnel records and fixing any problems found before the unit is mobilized. 51 Unanticipated "surge" requirements will reduce predictability, and the resulting improvements in ARNG unit readiness offered by standard operating cycles, as they did with the Air Force's Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept following the events of September 11, 2001
and during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. 52 However for "steady state" operations the Army should establish standard operating cycles, which will ultimately lead to an improved level of readiness and enable ARNG units to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model. 53 SERVICE MEMBER / FAMILY / EMPLOYER TRIAD "The three legged stool of the guard and reserve is only as sturdy as the weakest legservice member, family, employer." 54 Service members, families and employers of ARNG soldiers compose a triad that can have a significant impact on unit readiness levels and ultimately on the ability of units to successfully mobilize within the timelines of the new mobilization model. All must be adequately supported in order for units to sustain required readiness levels.
The Service Member
To assess the service member leg of this triad one must look at it in terms of individual soldier readiness. Individual soldier readiness is a substantial limiting factor in the ability of ARNG units to mobilize quickly. 55 A key to sustaining required unit readiness levels is ensuring individual soldier readiness. Unit readiness is primarily a function of having the required number individual soldiers in a unit who meet requirements for deployment. 56 Medical and dental fitness and training certification are two areas that are particularly challenging to maintaining required unit readiness levels. 57 Medical and dental-related deficiencies were fairly common during mobilizations for
Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. 58 These deficiencies negatively impact unit readiness overall and result in delays in the mobilization timeline. The Department of Defense Mobilization Symposium suggested two initiatives to prevent medical-related deficiencies from negatively impacting individual soldier readiness. The first was to apply resources to conduct pre-mobilization medical screening for individual soldiers. 59 The second was to then provide soldiers who have medical or dental deficiencies access to treatment through permanent changes in existing laws and regulations. 60 The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act authorized, as a permanent health benefit, medical and dental screening and care for reserve component soldiers who were alerted for mobilization. 61 This will assist in identifying and correcting many medical and dental deficiencies prior to mobilization. The ARNG should not overlook the importance of educating soldiers and families about the benefits of TRICARE and other healthcare programs. Many soldiers and families fail to learn about the benefits until mobilization is imminent. Families have a significant number of other issues and decisions to make during the pre-deployment process. A solid health benefits education program, conducted at least annually, will prepare soldiers and families to make healthcare decisions that are best for their families long before they are forced to upon mobilization. 72 
The Employer
Employers are the final component of the triad. The sacrifices they make while employees are deployed in defense of the nation are considerable. The employer link to ARNG readiness comes primarily in the areas of recruiting and retention. Potential loss of a civilian job is a significant concern of RC members. 73 This concern could cause soldiers to choose to terminate their military service, or it could prevent potential recruits from enlisting to begin with. be required to provide employer information for the database. 74 This requirement could be established either in legislation or in regulatory guidance at National Guard Bureau level. 75 The risk of losing pay and benefits can also cause anxiety for soldiers when facing mobilization. Many soldiers are self-employed or own small businesses and stand to face financial hardship when mobilized. Some employers may also face hardship when continuing to provide compensation to deployed soldiers or simply by reduction in productivity due to the extended loss of employee(s) as a result of mobilization. This is especially significant for owners of small businesses. In light of frequent, extended mobilizations of RC soldiers in recent years, consideration should be given to providing compensation as appropriate to affected employers and self-employed soldiers. One may initially only consider the readiness of individual soldiers as affecting the mobilization process. Clearly all three elements of the service member, family and employer triad are major players in the ability of the Army National Guard to achieve readiness levels required to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
CONCLUSION
The Army National Guard historically has been and will continue to be a critical part of the Total Force the nation relies on to protect its interests both at home and abroad. The Chief of The Reserve components will continue to be a significant part of the Total Force, operating along side the active-duty force in an environment where the pace of change is rapid, where requirements evolve, and where enemies are far less predictable than in the past. Thus, it is essential to make the mobilization process more relevant and effective in this environment."
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The new mobilization model, "train, certify, alert, deploy" aims to provide Combatant
Commanders the right forces and capabilities "just in time" to accomplish their operational mission in this new security environment. The implication of the new model for the ARNG is that it must increase overall personnel and training readiness in units to sustain the readiness required to meet the shorter timelines of the new mobilization model. Improvements in personnel readiness will result from: reducing ARNG forces structure while sustaining end strength; rebalancing the force to reduce frequent involuntary mobilizations; providing predictability of mobilization to soldiers with standard operating cycles; and improving support to soldiers, families and employers. Improvements in training readiness will result from: leveraging web-based technology as part of ARNG Transformation; continuing the AGRI and fielding MLBs that are easier and less costly to train than existing heavy combat units; establishing standard operating cycles to provide predictability to units, thus enabling them to more effectively schedule required training for soldiers and changing existing laws to allow soldier to be mobilized for training. Transforming the ARNG, rebalancing and restructuring the force, establishing standard operating cycles and improving soldier, family and employer readiness will, in combination, assist in posturing the ARNG for success in achieving and sustaining readiness levels required to meet the timelines of the new mobilization model.
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